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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a detailed description of the applied methodology used to study 
collective action in natural resource management (NRM). Data were collected in 48 villages in 
northeastern Burkina Faso, at the community, institutional, household and market levels.  The 
paper first discusses the analytical framework underlying the study of collective action, and then 
describes in detail the methods used to measure collective action and community-level 
cooperative capacity, and the determinants of cooperative capacity.  We also describe data 
collection methods as well as potential problems in eliciting unbiased information. The impact of 
cooperative capacity on a variety of outcomes observed at both the community and household 
level is then presented in order to highlight practical applications.   
 
Keywords: collective action; natural resource management; Burkina Faso; cooperation; social 
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This paper provides a synthesis of a research project undertaken in northeastern 
Burkina Faso, which focused on collective action in natural resource management 
(NRM).  Results presented below are based on a survey undertaken in 48 villages in two 
Sahelian Provinces: Oudalan and SØno (map shown in Appendix 2) during the end of the 
rainy season, 2000 (Drabo and Dutilly-Diane 2001).  
While there has been much discussion of the factors affecting the success of 
collective action, little has been done to consider the practical application of these 
concepts in empirical settings.   One difficulty is in defining certain terms such as ￿social 
capital￿, and after agreeing on a definition for the term, in determining what observable 
indicators actually measure social capital (Bardhan 1993 and 2001; Grootaert et al. 1999).  
Even when there is agreement on certain concepts and their measurement, the impact on 
cooperation is often disputed.    Though competing arguments have been put forth by 
nearly everyone writing on ￿successful￿ cooperation and collective action at the local 
level, we can use the case studies collected in Berkes & Folke (1998) to illustrate the 
wide range of variables over which there is disagreement about the impact on 
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cooperation: 1) Size of the Group: Groups should be small ￿ to decrease transactions and 
communications costs and because small is generally associated with homogeneous 
groups (Gadgil et al. 1998; Sporrong 1998; Hanna 1998; Alcorn & Toledo 1998; Jodha 
1998),  but groups cannot be too small or they won￿t be able to cover the costs of 
cooperation (Hanna), 2) Profitability:  Prices, or relative profitability, should be high 
enough to make collective action profitable (Chpts. Begossi 1998; Warren & Pinkston 
1998; Hanna 1998), but not too high so as to induce over-exploitation of the resource 
(Gadgil et al.1998; Berkes 1998; Jodha 1998),   3) Isolation:  Systems should be 
relatively isolated, so as to reduce outside pressure on traditional authorities and to enable 
the community to effectively exclude ￿outsiders￿ (Sporrong 1998; Hanna 1998; Alcorn & 
Toleda 1998; Jodha 1998), but not too isolated because this may mean very thin markets 
and returns may be too low to cover costs of cooperation (Hanna), because (regulated) 
contact with the outside may introduce valuable new technologies and/or practices 
(Warren & Pinkston), and because exposure to (but not domination by) outside cultures 
increases cultural capital and promotes flexible institutions (Begossi 1998); and  4) 
Strong Social Cohesion: Strong kinship-based relationships or belief in supernatural 
forces is essential for promoting and enforcing collective action and group cooperation in 
the management of resources (Sporrong 1998; Berkes 1998; Warren & Pinkston 1998; 
Alcorn & Toledo 1998); but too much reliance on community ties or the supernatural 
may lead to collapse of effective mechanisms for controlling resource use when these are 
challenged and where the explicit link between the social norm and sustainable practices 
is not clear (Gadgil et al. 1998), or may promote cultural and institutional inertia in the 




Given the messy state of affairs in the broader literature, in this paper we consider 
a particular study of 48 villages located in northeastern Burkina Faso, and detail how we 
conceptualized, measured and applied different measures of cooperative capacity, how 
these measures relate to explanatory factors hypothesized to affect cooperation, and 
finally, the impact of these indicators on a variety of outcomes observed at both the 
community and household level.  In the conclusion, we consider how results from this 
study can be used to more clearly identify the expected impacts of explanatory variables 
on NRM outcomes, and the indirect impact of these variables on NRM via an impact on 
cooperation itself. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief 
overview of the current situation in northeastern Burkina Faso. In section 3, we present 
an overview of the underlying theoretical framework motivating the development of 
indicators of cooperative capacity, the variables that affect this capacity, and in turn, how 
this capacity affects NRM outcomes.  We then consider practical problems regarding the 
survey instruments and data collection in section 4.  In section 5, we develop measures of 
cooperative capacity, and in section 6, we examine the determinants of cooperative 
capacity.  Results of a number of analyses using cooperative capacity as an explanatory 
variable in community-level decisions on land use and management and conflicts, 
household income patterns, and household decisions to engage in collective action are 




2. OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN NORTHEASTERN BURKINA FASO 
Burkina Faso is an agro-pastoral Sahelian country, where livestock production has 
always been an important component of agricultural activity.  In the drier northern 
regions, livestock production is based on extensive and semi-extensive systems where 
access to common grazing lands and transhumance is heavily relied upon to provide 
forage resources.    In such systems, there is wide scope for collective action and 
cooperation to influence land use and allocation patterns, resource management, 
investments and maintenance of community resources, and household income and well 
being.  For instance, stock densities on community pastures determine the productivity of 
land in animal production, and to the extent that productivity falls due to over-stocking, 
there will be pressure to change land allocation in favor of private crop activities.  The 
extent to which community members migrate to non-community pastures thereby 
relieving pressure on home resources also affects productivity of land in pasture, and will 
also have an indirect impact on land allocation decisions at the community level.  Clearly, 
herd mobility and activities such as manure contracting between farmers with few 
animals and transhumant pastoralists require coordination at the supra-household level.  
Finally, decisions on community-level investments (e.g. water point construction and 
maintenance, agro-forestry investments, bush clearing, soil erosion control measures), 
and the effectiveness with which these decisions are implemented will have a direct 
impact on both short-term profitability and long-term sustainability of alternative 
production activities.   
Within the household economy, undertaking a range of crop and livestock 




diversify food and cash income sources.   Yet, despite the many benefits of integrated 
crop-livestock production in these environments and despite the fact that many 
households engage in both livestock and crop activities, there remain contentious issues 
over land use and land allocation patterns and the appropriate institutions for managing 
natural resources ￿ sometimes leading to violent conflict.  Furthermore, increased 
population pressure and sedentarization of the pastoral population are thought to 
contribute to increased pressure on the natural resource base.  It is also hypothesized that 
current government land policy and the indeterminacy of the government￿s role in land 
tenure has made it difficult for community members to create new institutional forms for 
managing resources  (Ouedraogo 1993 and 2001).  
Nonetheless, households increasingly have greater incentives to actively manage 
their natural resources, even when this must be done in conjunction with all community 
members, or, in the case of mobility, with members from neighboring or far distant 
communities.  In all communities in the study region, at least some part of community 
land is common pasture.  Community waterpoints require maintenance, and sometimes 
use rules, in order to satisfy both human and livestock needs.  Trees are often planted in 
common pastures to provide shade for animals and as a mean of soil erosion control.  
There are a number of other soil erosion control techniques observed in the communities 
(e.g. stone bunds).  Though these are usually constructed on individual cropland, labor is 
collectively provided and there are also spillover benefits to the community as a whole in 
terms of reduced soil erosion.  
We hypothesize that the success of collective action will be a function of 




the capacity of the community as a whole to cooperate and to manage these incentives, 
and the overall policy environment in which these institutions must operate.   Our focus 
in this paper is on a community￿s capacity to cooperate, developing indicators of this 
capacity, identifying determinants of capacity, and then using these indicators to examine 
the impact of cooperative capacity on a variety of outcomes at both the household and 
community levels. 
 
3. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
Before starting, we define a few terms that we employ in the remainder of the 
paper: collective action in NRM, cooperation, externalities, capacity to cooperate, 
indicators of collective action, and determinants of collective action. 
For the purpose of this paper, we define collective action in NRM as the act of 
internalizing negative externalities and/or the generation of positive externalities in the 
use and management of natural resources.  Externalities occur whenever one person￿s 
decisions affect outcomes for another person. The traditional example is that of livestock 
on common pasture; the number of livestock one person puts on the pasture affects 
his/her own production and also affects livestock production of all others sharing the 
commons as well.  In this case, use of the common pasture generates a negative 
externality.  An example of a positive externality is given by soil erosion control 
measures, which improve soil productivity in the specific area in which such measures 
are employed but also generate positive externalities via improved erosion control over a 
much wider area.  In this context, cooperation is identical to collective action and we use 




The capacity of the community to cooperate is the underlying ability of the 
community to create formal and informal frameworks to achieve goals of collective 
action, no matter what those goals are.  This is an important distinction, since many 
previous analyses have conflated the underlying capacity to undertake any activity with 
the particular characteristics and incentives to undertake a specific activity. Certain 
variables may affect both the capacity to cooperate in general, as well as the incentives to 
undertake a particular action.  The number of members provides an example of a variable 
that is likely to affect both the capacity to cooperate in general and individual incentives 
to undertake many activities in particular.  For instance, the number of members is 
hypothesized to have an inverted-U shaped impact on cooperative capacity.  Starting with 
few members, fixed costs of cooperation per member are at their highest, and decrease as 
the number of members increases, which fosters cooperation.  Eventually, however, these 
lower fixed costs per member will be offset by increasing variable costs of cooperation, 
which increase because of the time needed to coordinate activities, negotiate decisions, 
agree on procedures for implementation, and monitor and enforce rules.  At the same 
time, consider the effect of an increase in members on the individual incentives to 
undertake specific natural resource management activities. Greater membership increases 
the individual incentives to overexploit a common-pool resource.  Individual incentives 
to under-provide labor for maintaining water points may also increase as the number of 
members increases.  On the other hand, more members may increase individual 
incentives to provide certain types of public goods, especially those subject to increasing 




network externalities.  This is but one example; in this paper, we attempt to highlight the 
impact of various factors on cooperative capacity specifically. 
The major focus of the empirical analysis below is to recover the underlying 
capacity to cooperate at the community level, which is not directly observable and is 
rather a latent variable. For this purpose, we use a factor analysis of variables thought to 
be associated with cooperative capacity, in order to recover our main latent variable 
(Penning and Leuthold, 2000).  Given our particular dataset, indicators of collective 
action are drawn from two main categories: networks and organizational performance.  
Network indicators include the density of organizations and density of household 
participation; organizational performance indicators include number of rules, regulations, 
activities, and effective participation by members in activities and at meetings. 
Determinants of cooperative capacity are those variables hypothesized to directly affect 
the capacity of a community to make and enforce collective action decisions; we defer a 
discussion of the these specific determinants to section 6. 
At this point, it may be useful to consider a term that we will not be using, social 
capital.  The term ￿social capital￿ has recently become a popular term to describe a type 
of stock of goodwill amongst community members; trust is often considered one of the 
key aspects of social capital (Seabright 1994; Dasgupta & Serageldin 2001). To date, 
most analyses have considered the impact of ￿social capital￿ on private, or individual, 
welfare.  For instance, social capital may facilitate reciprocal insurance arrangements 
thereby decreasing household or individual risk, or it may be used to facilitate access to 
credit or information leading to increased productivity and better marketing opportunities 




measure the impact of ￿social capital￿ on cooperation at the community level, though c.f. 
Krishna (2001). 
Nonetheless, many scholars, particularly economists, find the term ￿social 
capital￿ confusing or simply misleading, since it seems natural to try and relate the 
concept of social capital to other forms of capital with which economists are intimately 
familiar (c.f. chapters by Arrow and Stiglitz in Dasgupta and Seregeldin 2000).  In the 
final chapter of the Dasgupta and Seregeldin book, Dasgupta argues that ￿social capital￿ 
may in fact be better described as a factor that determines, in part, total factor 
productivity.  In other words, ￿social capital￿ factors enable the more traditional capital 
variables to be combined more efficiently.  Structures or processes that improve 
organizational efficiency have long been considered factors that improve total factor 
productivity, as distinct from the stocks of capital combined to produce an output ￿ it is 
the ￿how￿ and not the ￿what￿ of production.  Ford￿s production line is an example of 
￿how￿; more output could be produced from the same stock of labor and physical capital.  
The increase was due to the way in which factors were combined that lead to an increase 
in total factor productivity.  In the same vein, if my neighbor and I were making 
individual decisions regarding how many animals to put on a piece of land that we both 
shared, and we were overstocking in the sense that both of us could be made better off if 
we decided on the optimal number for both of us together, then a change in the 
institutional framework as to ￿how￿ we arrived at a decision ￿ from individual to joint 
maximization -- seems naturally to be a change in ￿how￿, which in turn increases the 




an overly pedantic concern, in the remainder of the paper, we eschew the use of the term 
￿social capital￿ and instead use cooperative capacity. 
4. SURVEY INSTRUMENTS AND DATA COLLECTION 
This study is based on a survey administered in 48 communities of four 
administrative regions (Gorgadji, Dori, Gorom and Bani) of the provinces of SØno and 
Oudalan during the end of rainy season (August - October) of the year 2000. The study 
was undertaken in collaboration with the Programme Sahel Burkinabe (PSB) supported 
by GTZ, and one of the objectives of the research was to measure the impact of the 
various projects and programs on natural resource management and household livelihood 
strategies.  Thus, communities were stratified into four categories on the basis of the 
length of participation in various PSB/GTZ programs, as follows: villages working with 
GTZ before 1996 (13), villages that entered the program between 1996 and 1999 (12), 
new GTZ￿s villages (9) and a group of control villages which have never worked with 
GTZ (14).  
Table 1--Village sampling 
 
 Gorgadji  Dori  O.  Gorom  Bani  Total 
Before  96  7 4 2 - 13 
After 96  -  6  6  -  12 
New -  -  4  5  9 
Control -  -  7  7  14 
     Total  7  10 19 12 48 
 
4.1. DATA 
Data were collected in 48 communities located in northeastern Burkina Faso, in 
the two provinces of Ouadalan and Seno; a map of the region is found in Appendix 2.  At 
the household level, information was gathered from the head of household with the 




resources and households￿ participation in collective action.  Data were also collected on 
the institutions and more formal organizations that dealt with NRM.  Such organizations 
and institutions operated at various levels.  Some were village-level, others pertained only 
to a sub-group of community members (i.e. operated at the level of quarters within a 
village, or included only members with a shared interest/economic objective), and others 
operated at the supra-village level (i.e. unions of various types of organizations).  Very 
basic information was also collected on additional projects and organizations that did not 
deal with NRM issues.  Extensive information was also collected on the community as a 
whole, including basic demographic information, structure and mobility of all livestock 
herds in the community, infrastructure, and detailed information on land allocation and 
resource mapping using aerial photographs as a base.  Finally, data were collected at six 
markets identified as being important for livestock transactions for surveyed 
communities. A fuller description of the survey instruments and comments on some of 
the problems encountered during fieldwork are discussed in the remainder of this section. 
4.2.  SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
Household Surveys:  The first task was to define the household.  Because 
livestock is the primary income generating activity in this region and because we were 
interested particularly in the use and management of common pastures and herd mobility, 
we defined a household as comprised by all individuals whose livestock income depends 
on the same herd.  A total of 401 household heads were interviewed; or, about 8.5 
households per community on average, with a minimum of 7 households and a maximum 
of 19 per community.  The main sections of the survey were:  household demographic 




by source (agriculture, off-farm local, migrant remittances), and household members￿ 
participation in community-based organizations and natural resource management 
activities.   
Institutional Questionnaire: This questionnaire was administered collectively to 
the village leader, representatives of the major NRM institutions and other key 
informants.  Three broad types of data were collected.  First, a census was taken of all 
institutions (e.g. the chief) and organizations in charge of any aspect of NRM, and 
detailed information was recorded regarding the structure of management, how the 
organization was created and who/what group began the organization, the number of 
members, frequency of meetings and attendance at those meetings, etc.  This section was 
followed by an enumeration of all activities related to NRM in the community with 
detailed information on the activities, the institution or organizations responsible, 
methods of monitoring and enforcing participation, and actual participation rates.  This 
part of the survey was structured to gather information by resource: common pastures, 
water sources, soil, and tree resources. Information gathered by activity and resource 
could then be cross-referenced with the institutional data gathered in the first section, and 
by data collected at the household level.  The final section of the survey gathered 
information on rules and regulations, following a similar format to that for the activities 
section. 
Because the institutional questionnaire had many open-ended and quasi open-
ended questions, some of the data recording suffered from enumerator bias. While certain 
￿prompts￿ were used ￿ enumerators asked about different rules by resource and 




enumerator to structure discussions with participants. Three enumerators, all with 
experience in both structured and open-ended survey techniques were trained, and they 
worked together with project members to refine the structure of the questionnaire through 
a series of pre-testing and refinement exercises.  Nonetheless, it is a fact that more open-
ended techniques are more likely to suffer from enumerator bias, and this problem should 
be directly addressed when structuring the questionnaire and training.  Methods of 
triangulation have been employed by other researchers to limit the potential for collecting 
biased or skewed information introduced by interviewing a small number of non-
randomly sampled key informants, but it should be emphasized that triangulation 
measures will not mitigate bias introduced by the enumerator him/herself.  In general, 
then, we feel that enumerator bias in open-ended data gathering formats has been glossed 
over.  As an example from our particular case, one enumerator had had recent experience 
working with an NGO on implementation of water point maintenance project.  This 
enumerator tended to engage his interviewees in much more in-depth discussions of 
water and recordings of activities, participation, etc., and recorded information was 
significantly different from that collected by the other two enumerators.  On the other 
hand, there was no statistical difference in any of the purely quantitative measures 
gathered by these same enumerators.  Because the information on water management was 
so different between enumerators, much of these data were simply lost.  In other cases 
where bias was less extreme, we constructed ￿inflation coefficients￿ based on the 
enumerator average vs. the sample average for biased variables, and constructed 
￿corrected￿ variable estimates by multiplying actual recorded values by the inflation 




Community-Level Questionnaire and Resource Mapping Exercise:  Data on the 
main characteristics of the community was collected, such as basic demographic data 
(number of households by ethnicity, number of female-headed households, number of 
quarters within the village, etc.), resources shared with other communities, herd 
demography and mobility, community infrastructure, and identification of major markets 
used by community members.  Though difficult and somewhat time consuming, 
collection of data on large and small ruminants was largely accomplished by considering 
the number of cattle, goats and sheep of each individual household, usually counted by 
quarter in the larger villages.  Information on herd mobility, following a 12-month 
calendar, was also elicited in this manner.   In addition, aerial photographs were used to 
construct resource maps for each community, and to identify community boundaries ￿ 
including identification of areas over which resources were shared with other 
communities. Boundary coordinates were also obtained with GPS units (Garmin).   
Resource maps included information on land use and soil types, key resources such as 
waterpoints and sand dunes, and the location of the village, hamlets and roads.   
Market Questionnaire:  Data on prices for 3-5 year old male bovines, cereals and 
dairy products were collected in six markets during three separate months during the 
year, August, 2000, November, 2000, and March, 2001.  Of the six markets, three were 





5.   MEASURING THE CAPACITY TO COOPERATE 
5.1  AGGREGATING INFORMATION AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL 
 
As noted above, one of the primary reasons for collecting detailed data on NRM 
institutions and organizations was to be able to capture the underlying capacity of a 
community to cooperate. We hypothesize that certain communities will be able to 
organize more efficiently to achieve community-level goals ￿ irrespective of what those 
goals might be ￿ and we use a factor analysis of the characteristics of formal NRM 
organizations to recover this latent capacity to cooperate.  For the factor analysis, 
information on the wide-rage of institutions and more formal organizations in each 
community is aggregated to create variables at the community level.   A detailed 
description of the construction of aggregated variables and the results of the factor 
analysis are first presented, followed by an econometric analysis of the determinants of 
the constructed factors. 
5.2  CHOICE OF VARIABLES 
There are two sets of variables often considered to affect a group￿s capacity to 
cooperate; the degree of trust amongst members and network capacity.  Unfortunately, no 
proxies of ￿trust￿ were obtained.   The density of organizations and the participation rates 
by households in these organizations are used to proxy network capacity; these variables 
reflect the capacity to share information and facilitate the transformation of information 
into knowledge and action. We also consider a third set of characteristics, hereafter 
referred to as ￿organizational￿ achievements, which includes such variables as frequency 




undertaken, and whether or not labor contributions are made.  We recognize that the 
organizational achievements of any one organization will be influenced by other factors 
specific to the final goals of that organization.  Nonetheless, we posit that the aggregation 
of these intermediate performance indicators across community-level institutions reflects 
community￿s latent, unobservable, capacity to cooperate. 
More specifically, the variables used in the factor analysis to recover cooperative 
capacity are as follows: 
•  NRM Network:  Number of NRM institutions/organizations per household 
•  NRM Membership:  Percent of households that are members of NRM 
institution/organizations, averaged over all NRM institutions, multiplied by the 
number of these organizations 
•  Non-NRM Network: Number of non-NRM institutions/organizations per 
household (i.e.. women￿s groups) 
•  Non-NRM Membership: Average percent of household members of non-NRM 
organizations, multiplied by the number of these organizations.   
•  Meetings:  Number of meetings held per year, averaged over all NRM 
organizations 
•  Rules: Total number of rules observed for all NRM organizations 
•  Activities: Total number of activities observed for all NRM organizations 
•  Average Meetings Participation Rate:  We asked how many households ￿usually￿ 
attended meetings; this number was used to create the percent of households 
attending meetings for each institution, and a variable was constructed of the 




•  Average Activities Participation Rate:  As with the meetings variable, the percent 
of households ￿usually￿ participating was constructed, and an average was taken 
across organizations. 
•  Average number of workdays allocated to collective activities, per member 
 
5.3. AGGREGATING INDICATORS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
As a first step, we note that if these variables do indeed give information on an 
underlying capacity to cooperate, they should be significantly correlated. Table 2 presents 
the correlation matrix and indicates whether the variables are correlated at the 85% level 
of significance.  
Table 2--Correlation matrix between 10 indicators of CA. 
    A B C D E F G H I  J 
A                               
B  +                            
C  + +                        
D  + + +                     
E                       
F   +  +                  
G   +  -               
H  +                   
I  +  +       +  +       
J                 +     +  +    
                         
A ￿ Network NRM      F - # rules         
B ￿ Membership in NRM    G - # activities       
C ￿ Network non-NRM    H ￿ Participation rate in meetings  
D ￿ Membership non-NRM   I ￿ Participation rate in activities   
E - # meetings      J - # days worked        
 
The correlation matrix shows that many of variables are positively and 
significantly correlated, with the exception of the number of activities and membership in 




captured in the factor analysis.  Results of a principal component factor analysis for the 
first two factors, which had eigenvalues greater than one, are presented below.  
 
  First  Factor   Second  Factor 
Eigenvalue:  1.39    1.02 
Cumulative:  .50        .79 
 
Table 3--Scoring coefficients for first two factors 
 
Variables INC ICC 
    
Network NRM  0.241  -0.065 
Membership NRM  0.355  0.087 
Network others   0.300 -0.291 
Membership others  0.168 -0.175 
# Meetings  0.032  0.071 
# Activities  0.058  0.207 
# Rules  -0.013  0.101 
Participation in 
meetings 0.028  0.091 
Participation in work  0.132 0.422 
# Days of work  0.087  0.223 
 
To highlight scoring coefficients with strong loadings, we have put those with 
coefficients greater than |.1| in bold.  Looking at the first factor in table 3, we note that the 
scoring coefficients are relatively high and positive for the network and membership 
variables and to a lesser extent on percent of members who actually contribute labor, but 
coefficients are relatively low for number and participation in meetings, activities, rules 
and the total number of days worked.  Given these scoring coefficients, we hereafter refer 




In contrast, scoring coefficients for the second factor are strong and positive for 
most of the variables measuring active participation ￿ number of rules, number of 
activities, participation in activities and the number of days worked ￿ with the exception 
of participation in meetings.  The coefficients for density and number of meetings for 
non-NRM organizations are actually negative.  Given the heavier weight on variables 
associated with making and implementing decisions, we hereafter refer to this factor as 
the indicator of implementation capacity (IIC). 
 
6. ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF COOPERATIVE CAPACITY 
In this section, we examine the determinants of the estimated indices of 
cooperative capacity.  This is done to test whether the explanatory factors are consistent 
with theory, though as noted in the following discussion, there remains wide 
disagreement on the theoretical impact of many variables on cooperative capacity.  Total 
number of households and the square of households are included to test the hypothesis 
that cooperation is more difficult both with few households, because of fixed costs, and 
with many households, because of increased variable costs of communication and 
monitoring (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990; de Janvry et al. 1998).   The impact of 
heterogeneity is still a source of contention in the wider literature.  Here, we include two 
measures of heterogeneity: i) social heterogeneity, proxied by the number of quarters 
within a village and the number of ethnic groups, and ii) an indicator of cattle ownership 
heterogeneity
4.  Social heterogeneity is almost always hypothesized to have a negative 
affect on cooperation, because different social norms may make creating and enforcing 
                                                 
4 Heterogeneity in cattle ownership is a simple variance measure of livestock holdings, using just three data 




decisions more costly.  On the other hand, at least some researchers posit that socio-
cultural homogeneity may lead to a stagnation of ideas and may foster institutional 
inertia, thereby leading to lower overall institutional capacity vis-￿-vis communities with 
greater socio-cultural diversity (Begossi 1998).  There is also wide disagreement on the 
impact of heterogeneity in wealth. On the one hand, wealth heterogeneity may make 
finding agreements that are mutually beneficial to all more difficult.  On the other hand, a 
subset of members may now find it in their best interest to undertake certain activities 
(Olson 1965; Baland and Platteau 1997), or wealthier members may find it in their 
interest to assume leadership and benefactor roles within a community (Wade 1987). The 
theoretical impact of this variable is thus ambiguous. Exit options, proxied by the 
percentage of households with at least one member engaged in migration for wage work 
is expected to reduce cooperative capacity, since it weakens social cohesion and may 
make it more difficult to make and enforce collective decisions (Bhardan 1993).  Income 
variability, i.e. fluctuations in both crop and animal yields due to rainfall variability, is 
hypothesized to increase cooperative capacity, since it is hypothesized to increase the 
relative value of cooperative agreements, particular where these can also serve as mutual 
insurance (Poteete 2001; McCarthy 1999).  Alternatively, high variability may reduce 
cooperative capacity to the extent that it obscures the link between cooperation and 
improvements in natural resources and diminishes the capacity of a group to engage in 
learning by doing (Berkes 1998).   To proxy for environmental variability, we collected 
information on both rainfall and natural divisible vegetation indices (NDVI) 
corresponding to each community.  There is rather strong negative correlation between 




of rainfall vs. the impact of variability.  We mainly use the coefficient of variation of 
rainfall, with the recognition that this variable is higher in areas with low rainfall but high 
rainfall variability. 
 The extent to which community resources are shared with either neighboring 
communities or with transhumant herders may also reduce cooperative capacity by 
making communication and enforcement more costly.  Education in general is 
hypothesized to favor cooperative capacity by increasing individuals￿ capacity to acquire 
information and transform such information into knowledge.  Distance to the regional 
capital may also have an ambiguous impact on the capacity to cooperate.  On the one 
hand, the greater the distance, the less likely that the activities of non-community 
government officials will interfere with the authority and activities of local organizations.  
On the other hand, distance to the capital may reflect higher costs of learning about other 
instances of collective action in the region and reduced spillover benefits from examples 
of other successful interventions, thereby leading to lower cooperative capacity.   
We also consider a set of variables capturing the structure of the organizations in 
the community.  Roughly following the structure, conduct and performance literature, we 
are hypothesizing that the structure of organizations can either enhance or diminish 
cooperative capacity.  We are proposing that more participatory forms of decision 
making mean that more decisions will be made, monitored and enforced.   Using 
information on the proportion of organizations in which the chief has the sole 
responsibility for making rules, for monitoring members￿ abidance by the rules, and for 
enforcing the rules, we created a variable called ￿chief dominant￿, which is a sum of 




organizations/institutions where the chief plus others, e.g. members of an executive 
committee, make the rules together (collective rule-making), and finally the proportion of 
organizations where the rules are made by an executive committee or elected (or 
nominated) president, but without any involvement of the chief (members-only rule-
making).      
Finally, we take into account the presence of external programs/projects (mainly 
international NGO￿s) and the duration of these programs, to test the effect on cooperative 
capacity.  We have divided the number of programs in existence since before 1986 with 
those beginning sometime during 1987-1993, and those beginning after 1993.  As noted 
above, the study was undertaken in conjunction with PSB/GTZ, and the coordinator of 
PSB/GTZ delineated three distinct conceptual frameworks guiding project 
implementation, and noted that the change in frameworks leading to a change in 
development paradigms affected many projects in the region (Grell, personal 
communication).  In general, most programs/projects beginning before 1986 had an 
overwhelming focus on technical solutions to crop production and NRM, whereas those 
beginning during the period 1987-1993 largely adopted the ￿terroir￿ approach, with a 
focus on specific resources within given boundaries.  Many projects/programs beginning 
after 1993 expanded on the ￿terroir￿ approach to consider the system as a whole, 
including community members￿ use of non-community resources and vice-versa.   
Regression results are summarized in Table 4 below, full statistical results are 




Table 4--The determinants of collective action 
   INC  IIC 
Demographic/Agro-Ecological    
Size community  ---    
Size community sq.  ++    
# Quarters  ++    
Heterogeneity in cattle holding  ++    
# Ethnic groups   + 
% Adults migrating  ++   -- 
% Households with public education   +  ++ 
Rainfall variability  ++ -- 
Institutions structure     
% Making, monitoring and enforcement 
undertaken by chief only       
% Rules made in collaboration  ++    
% Rules made without the chief     -- 
# Projects     
Before 1988  ++    
1986-1993 (Terroir approach)     ++ 
1993-2001 (NRM approach)     +  
Distance to regional capital  --    
External pressure     
# village max. sharing pasture       
Transhumants using pasture      + 
+, (-) = positive (negative) and significant at the 10% level 
++, (--) = positive (negative) and significant at the 5% level 
 
The estimated equation for network capacity has fairly good explanatory power, 
but many of the significant coefficients are opposite in sign to those predicted by theory. 
Instead of corroborating the inverted-U shaped hypothesis regarding the impact of the 
number of households, the relationship is U-shaped and significant.  The coefficient of 
variation of rainfall is positively related to network capacity, indicating that low rainfall 
and high climatic variability increases the value of developing network capacity, which 
may itself reflect a mechanism to improve mutual insurance mechanisms within the 
community.  Distance to the regional capital is negative. Interestingly, the number of 
quarters, heterogeneity in livestock holdings, and the percent of households where at least 




sense that having many distinct neighborhoods and heterogeneity income-generation 
patterns increase the value of networks, this result highlights why network capacity in 
and of itself may not improve the capacity of community members to undertake 
collective action.   Education however, is positively related to network capacity, as we 
expect and the number of rules made in collaboration with the chief is also positive.  In 
summary, it appears that population dense, heterogeneous communities that are close to 
the regional capital and where many households rely on migration for wage work, there is 
a greater density of networks in both NRM and non-NRM related organizations and thus 
high network capacity.  Collaboration between the institution of the chief and household 
members, and the number of programs which begun in the earliest period (before 1986) 
also lead to higher network capacity. 
 At this point, it is worth comparing the estimation results for the network 
capacity index to previous work on ￿social capital￿, which focused on the ability of 
individuals to rely on social relationships to accrue private benefits ￿ e.g. to increase a 
households￿ access to insurance, credit and labor sharing arrangements.  The network 
capacity index constructed here appears to reflect the capacity of individuals to exploit 
social relationships to improve individual or household well-being, and in that sense, 
could be considered to proxy ￿social capital￿ as the term has been previously employed.   
Significant variables for the second equation are mostly different from those in 
the first equation.  Here, migration for wage work has a negative impact on 
implementation capacity, whereas the proportion of households with public schooling 
positively affects active capacity, as hypothesized.   The number of different ethnic 




diverse ethnic and social backgrounds increases the knowledge base and thus the 
possibilities for collective action.  The number of projects undertaken during the latter 
two periods also led to greater implementation capacity, indicating that the change in 
project focus may favor community level implementation over individual household 
adoption of specific techniques.   Neither collaborative rule-making nor whether the chief 
plays a dominant role have a statistically significant impact on implementation capacity, 
but interestingly, such capacity is lower in communities where a relatively large 
percentage of different organizations do not include the chief in the rule making process.   
This may arise because of friction between the institution of the chief and other 
organizations, or, it may be due to the fact that in communities where the role of the chief 
is diminishing rapidly, substitute organizations have not yet been able to substitute for 
roles previously undertaken by the chief.  It would certainly be worthwhile to collect 
further information on institutional change with the explicit aim of separating out 
permanent versus transitory effects; however, this type of analysis, which would require a 
long time series, is not possible with our dataset.    Finally, we note that the coefficient of 
variation in rainfall has a negative impact on implementation capacity.   This indicates 
that collective action may be less valuable in such areas, which is an interesting contrast 
with the network capacity variable, which is higher precisely in these areas. 
Overall, the estimated equations provide evidence that these indices capture 
different aspects of cooperative capacity.  In the next sections, we examine how these 
capacity indices impact land use and allocation patterns observed at the community level, 
conflicts observed in the communities, and household-level variables such as total 




7.  THE IMPACT OF COOPERATIVE CAPACITY 
7.1  COMMUNITY-LEVEL IMPACTS 
7.1.1  Land Allocation and Land Use 
McCarthy, and Dutilly-Diane (2002) developed a model of land allocated to crops 
vs. pastures, stock densities, and herd mobility; here we simply report part of the results 
to highlight the impact of the cooperative capacity indices.  All three dependent variables 
are hypothesized to be affected by cooperative capacity.   The land allocation decision ￿ 
between public pastures versus private crops ￿ is characterized by positive externalities, 
so we hypothesize that cooperative capacity increases land allocated to public pastures, 
all else equal (McCarthy et al. 1998).  The stock density decision is characterized by the 
traditional, negative crowding externality; therefore, cooperative capacity is hypothesized 
to have a negative effect on stock densities.  Finally, we hypothesize that effective herd 
mobility requires communication and coordination amongst community members, and 
thus that cooperative capacity should increase herd mobility
5.  Controlling for agro-
ecological, market, and demographic variables (as reported in Appendix 1 Table A2), the 
estimated equations give the following results: 
                                                 
5 Clearly, as with all the dependent variables discussed in the following sections, variables other than 
cooperative capacity will impact the herd mobility decision.  Relative rainfall realizations across the 
relevant region will obviously be a key factor; the theoretical model on which the empirical estimations are 
based assumes that for at least some rainfall realizations, only a fraction of herders will be mobile.  
Cooperative capacity may simply make the decision more efficient by acting as a ￿clearing house￿ of 
information, or it may increase herd mobility directly in the case where there is a tendency for a larger 
fraction to remain on the home pastures for a longer period of time thereby over-exploiting home resources 










Network Capacity   ++ --  + 
Implementation 
Capacity  
-- +   
 
The different capacity indices have strikingly different impacts on land use and 
allocation variables.  Network capacity actually leads to higher stock densities and less 
land in common pastures; two effects that we would expect to be associated with less 
successful collective action.  On the other hand, higher network capacity leads to greater 
herd mobility, as we would expect.  With regard to the implementation capacity index, a 
higher index leads to lower stock densities and a larger share of community land 
allocated to common pastures.  This index seems to better capture the ability of the 
community as a whole to internalize externalities in the use and management of 
community resources. 
7.1.2 Impact of cooperative capacity on conflicts 
Another important issue in the region is conflict resolution (Barry 1996; Kambou 
1997; Banzhaf et al. 2000; Drabo et al.2001; PSB/GTZ 1999). Conflicts can be internal to 
the village; the vast majority of which stem from crop damage by cattle (80% of 183 
registered conflicts). External conflicts (with neighboring villages and, rarely, with 
transhumants) often result from crop damage too, though conflicts surrounding 
encroachment also occur.  The impact of cooperative capacity on conflicts is difficult to 
capture when looking at a cross-section of data.  While potential endogeneity problems 
beset many analyses, it is particularly difficult to determine the impact of cooperative 
capacity on conflicts, without considering the likely impact of conflicts on cooperative 




negative and reinforcing; that is, we expect that lower cooperative capacity will lead to 
more conflicts, and that more conflicts will reduce cooperative capacity.  Given data 
constraints, we cannot separately estimate conflicts and cooperative capacity, and instead 
simply examine the correlation coefficients between conflicts, cooperative capacity and 
the land use and management variables from above (stock densities, common pasture 
land, herd mobility), which are presented in Table 6 below.  
 
Table 6--Matrix of Correlation coefficients*  
 Total  External  Internal  Crop  damage 
Network Capacity  -.01  -.15  .07 .02 
        
Implementation Capacity .03  -.01  .04  .08 
        
Stock density  -0.15  -0.29  0.12 -0.02 
       
Land in pasture  0.32  0.12  0.32 0.27 
        
Mobility  0.24  -0.01 0.19  0.28 
* Coefficients significant at the 10% level are reported in bold. 
 
First, we note that only one of the correlation coefficients among the conflicts and 
cooperative capacity variables is statistically significant.  The relationship between 
network capacity and external conflicts is negative, indicating that either network 
capacity reduces external conflicts, or that few external conflicts engender greater 
networks, or a combination of both effects.   
Regarding the land use and management variables, we see that stock densities are 
negatively correlated with external conflicts, while land in pasture and greater herd 
mobility are positively correlated with crop damage and total conflicts. The inter-
relationship between land use and management variables and conflicts is not necessarily 




conflicts.  For instance, higher stock densities may deter non-community members from 
using community pastures
6 with the consequent effect of reducing external conflicts.  At 
the same time, in areas with few external conflicts, livestock production may be 
considered less risky, thereby leading to increased stock densities.   Here, we expect the 
inter-relationship to be reinforcing; high densities reduce external conflicts, low external 
conflicts lead to higher stock densities.  In fact, the correlation coefficients are negative 
for 3 of the 4 conflict variables; but only the coefficient between stock densities and 
external conflicts is negative and significant.  Alternatively, a high percentage of land 
allocated to pastures may increase the potential for livestock to damage crops thereby 
leading to more conflicts, especially internal.  On the other hand, it seems reasonable to 
argue that the presence of many conflicts would increase privatization of resources and 
thus reduce land allocated to pasture.   So, we expect more pastureland to lead to higher 
conflicts, but higher conflicts to lead to less pastureland.  From the simple correlation 
coefficients, it appears that the first effect is stronger; more land in pasture, greater 
opportunities for conflict, and thus more conflicts.  Finally, a priori, we expect that 
mobility would be greater in areas with many conflicts, but that lower mobility itself 
would increase conflicts, especially those due to crop damage.  So, we expect conflicts to 
cause more mobility, but more mobility to reduce conflicts.  The correlation coefficient is 
consistent with the first hypothesis, that more conflicts increase the proportion of 
households engaging in mobility.   
                                                 




While fully recognizing data limitations, we draw on the above analysis to 
propose the following schematic representation of the relationships between cooperative 
capacity, land management and conflicts. 
Figure 1--Synthesis of relations between cooperative capacity, land management 
and conflicts 
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          Conflicts 
 
       Positive impact 
        Negative Impact 
Dashed lines indicate the hypothesized impact, even where that impact is not detected in the data. 
 
7.1.3  Community versus sub-group collective action 
Another question often of interest is how sub-groups within a community arise 
and how well they perform (Dutilly-DianØ 2001).   It is often hypothesized that sub-
groups form when total number of households or economic, social or cultural 




communities, we can only look at the sub-group vs. community-wide institutions for 
water sources, since there are only a few instances of sub-group formation for other types 
of NRM.   Since we are looking at a specific institution, we cannot use the cooperative 
capacity indices directly.  Instead, we simply examine the means on performance, 
structure, and certain demographic variables, to determine whether there are significant 
differences between community-wide vs. sub-group water institutions.  Results are 




Table 7--Comparison in mean for performance, structure indicators of water 
institutions, and community characteristics of water institutions: 







( 48 organizations in 16 
Communities) T-test
￿ 
Performance      
 #  Meetings  6.6  3.4  ** 
 
Participation in 
Meetings 0.84  0.75   




participated in work  0.69  0.71   
 
Monetary 
Contributions  1328 1080   
 
Proportion of 
households that paid 
contribution 0.91  .80  * 
Structure      
 Elected  bureau  0.14  0.17   
 Chief  Dominant  2.7  2.2   
  
Collective Rule-
Making .07  .08   
 
Rules made without 
Chief .09  .20  ** 
Community 
characteristics      
Size village       
# households  70  138  *** 
Ethnic Majority   0.75  0.62  ** 
Heterogeneity      
        In cattle holding  65  22   
% Households with cattle  0.78  0.66  ** 
# Quarters  4.1  6.5  *** 
# Ethnic groups  3.1  3.9  (*) 
# Spoken languages   2.6  3.5  ** 
External influence       
# Programs  2.1  2.5   
￿ T-test significant at: (*) 85%; * 90% ; ** 95%; *** 99% level. 
 
Communities where there is one water organization score higher on number of 
meetings and participation by members in terms of monetary contributions, but 




participation by the population in rule making, particularly in communities where 
community members are more likely to make rules without the participation of the chief.  
There is no difference on other structure and performance indicators, however.  The 
number of household belonging to water sub-groups is roughly the same as for 
community-wide water organizations, indicating that sub-groups are indeed forming to 
offset potential negative impacts on collective action when the total number of members 
becomes too large.  Various heterogeneity indicators are also strongly and positively 
correlated with sub-group formation.  Thus, statistical results confirm the hypothesis that 
sub-groups form in large and heterogeneous villages. 
7.2  ANALYSIS AT THE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL 
In this next section, we use household survey data to investigate the impact of the 
cooperative capacity on household incomes and composition of income.  We also 
consider the impact of cooperative capacity on individual households participation in 
various collective activities, including soil erosion control, reforestation and water point 
maintenance.   
 
7.2.1 Capacity, and household income level and diversification 
In this section, we present a summary of results found in Dutilly-Diane et al. 
(2002).  In that paper, the authors develop and estimate a household model of total 
income and income shares from crops, livestock, local off-farm activities (petty trading, 
handicrafts, etc.) and migration activities.  In the first stage, the authors determine that the 
household sample should be divided according to whether households are net buyers of 




impact of cooperative capacity on total income and income shares by these categories, 
full results are presented in Appendix 1, Tables A3 and A4. 
Table 8--Income and income shares  
   Total  Crops  Livestock  Off-local  Migration 
  Buyers of grain (355) 
Network Capacity     +         
Implementation 
Capacity  +     +       
  Self-Sufficient in grain (46) 
Network Capacity      -  +   
Implementation 
Capacity     +  -   
 
There is a distinctive effect of network vs. implementation capacity on the type of 
activities undertaken. First, consider the households that are net purchasers of grain ￿ 
who make up a large share of total households.  For this group, network capacity favors 
crops vs. livestock; that is, network capacity favors the activity relying almost completely 
on private inputs (cropping) vs. the activity relying significantly on common resources 
(livestock).  On the other hand, active cooperation leads to both higher livestock incomes 
and greater total income.  For the much smaller subset of households self-sufficient in 
grain, network capacity reduces the level of income from livestock, but leads to increased 
local off-farm income.  Implementation capacity has exactly the opposite effect; it leads 
to greater level of income from livestock. Altogether, these effects tend to offset each 
other, since there is no impact on total income. Neither index has a significant impact on 
the proportion of income generated from non-local income.  
The differential impact of the two cooperative capacity indices is really rather 
interesting.  The network density relationships that form the basis of much of the social 
capital literature indeed seem to increase household capacity to increase incomes from 




the region is relatively favorable for livestock production, and greater livestock 
production leads to higher total incomes for the large majority of households that are net 
grain purchasers.  Because of the reliance on common pool resources, livestock 
production requires active resource management.  A relatively high degree of network 
capacity does not enable community members to actively manage their resources, and 
indeed may best be seen as a second-best substitute in these environments. 
 
7.2.2 Community capacity to cooperate and household participation 
In this section, we ask ￿how does the capacity of a community to cooperate 
influence individual decisions to contribute to collective action?￿  Controlling for 
household characteristics as well as community-level variables in a standard probit model 
of the participation decision, we find that implementation capacity has a positive and 
significant impact on reforestation and erosion control activities but no effect on water 
activities and, because of the overwhelming importance of water activities in total 
activities at the household level, no effect on the decision to participate in any collective 
activity.  Network capacity has no impact on the participation decision for any of the 
activities
7.    To some extent, this partially reflects the construction of the two indices ￿ 
number of activities has a higher coefficient score on the implementation versus network 
capacity indicator, for instance.    Still, it is worth emphasizing that the indices were 
constructed from community-level data aggregated over a wide-range of community-
level organizations with the intent of capturing underlying cooperative capacity and is 
comprised of ten separate factors, whereas the participation decision discussed here is a 
household-level decision.   
                                                 




Looking at household participation statistics in Table 9, we note that nearly 2/3rds 
of households participate in at least one activity, which is most likely to be a water 
maintenance activity.  Only between 20-25% of households participated in erosion 
control and reforestation activities; activities which are influenced by cooperative 
capacity.  These results hint at different ￿need￿ for cooperative capacity, perhaps 
depending on the historical importance of various activities, with water source 
management/maintenance activities largely having a very long history compared to many 
of the reforestation and erosion control activities.   
 
Table 9--Household participation in NRM activities. 
 All  Water  Reforestation  Erosion 
      
# Households concerned in activity*360  310  225  268 
# Households undertaking  activity  243  67  44  67 
% Households undertaking activity  0.67  0.61  0.20  0.25 






8.  CONCLUSION 
The aim of the paper is to highlight the methodological issues surrounding the use 
of community-level data on cooperation, both in terms of constructing indicators of 
cooperative capacity, and using these indicators to explain various aspects of natural 
resource management and household livelihood strategies. The rich collection of data in 
this northeastern region of Burkina Faso allowed for multiple levels of analysis: 
community, groups within communities, and household.  
We believe there are a number of key lessons learned through the process of data 
collection and analyses.  First, we believe that the issue of enumerator bias when relying 
on open-ended interviewing techniques to elicit information from key informants or 
individuals is a problem that has received far too little serious attention.  At the very least, 
acknowledgement of the likely bias, along with developing measures to reduce the bias 
beforehand and manage it afterward, should be considered a crucial aspect of data 
collection.  
Secondly, a review of previous research shows that there is still a great deal of 
debate over the factors that determine ￿successful￿ collective action.  Equally important 
but less discussed is the fact that there remains a great deal of debate over what 
observable characteristics actually comprise ￿social capital￿, or, in our case, cooperative 
capacity, or indeed ￿cooperation￿.   We created indicators of cooperative capacity based 
on more than one characteristic precisely because we hypothesize that no single 
characteristic of any one organization is likely to reflect underlying cooperative capacity.  
Still, we must acknowledge that this is an ad hoc specification.   Because the 




variables hypothesized to affect cooperation, but again, we had to acknowledge that the 
impact of many variables is ambiguous in the general literature.  Finally, we used the 
indicators as explanatory variables or examined their correlation with other outcome 
variables that are hypothesized to be related to cooperative capacity. 
Looking at the evidence in its entirety, we believe that there is strong reason to 
believe that cooperative capacity may not be a ￿unique underlying factor￿, but rather 
capacity may itself have different components.   Individuals may access networks and 
sustain membership in organizations primarily for private benefit in terms of increased 
production, improved marketing, or insurance.  Individuals may also participate in 
organizations to undertake collective action and generate gains that accrue to the group as 
a whole, via the provision of public goods or mitigation of negative externalities.   What 
is good for the individual may not benefit the group; characteristics previously associated 
with ￿social capital￿ may not improve the capacity of a community to engage in 
collective action.   The determinants of network capacity ￿ heterogeneity, proximity to 
the regional center ￿ indicated that this variable may capture the capacity to use networks 
for individual gain.  This interpretation fits quite well with the results from land use and 
allocation patterns observed at the community level and in terms of individual income 
patterns.  Network capacity is also negatively correlated with conflicts.  Implementation 
capacity, on the other hand, behaves more in accord with the literature on determinants of 
￿successful collective action￿; again, particularly with respect to land use and allocation, 
and household income.  This capacity is also positively related to the probability that 
households engage in certain public goods provision activities, but it is also positively 




To summarize, because the theoretical framework to understand ￿ let alone 
measure ￿ collective action and cooperative capacity is still rudimentary at best, we feel 
that our results highlight the need to consider the issues from multiple angles. 
Corroborating ￿evidence￿ is simply necessary, since the nature of the empirical analysis 
is ad hoc. Results also need to feed back into the construction and development of more 
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Table A1--The determinants of collective action 
 
INC     IIC  
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat   
Demographic      
Size community  -.005 -3.89**  0.002 0.78  
Size community sq.  1.3E-05 2.78**  -1.61E-06 -0.22  
# Quarters  0.034 3.84**  0.005 0.35  
# Ethnic groups  -0.008 0.01  0.031 1.63 * 
Heterogeneity in cattle holding  0.018 2.31**  -0.016 -1.26  
% Adults migrating  0.515 2.09**  -1.205 -3.07 ** 
% Households w/ public education  0.454 2.09**  0.460 1.84 * 
Institutions structure      
Chief dominant chief  -0.001 -0.04  -0.051 -1.54  
% rules made in collaboration  0.328 3.12**  -0.058 -0.35  
% rules made without chief  -0.052 -0.56  -0.260 -1.76 * 
# Projects      
Before 1986  0.030 2.06**  -0.020 -0.87  
1986-1993 (Terroir approach)  0.019 1.21  0.083 3.36 ** 
1993-2001 (NRM approach)  0.027 1.07  0.079 1.96 * 
Distance to regional capital  -0.075 -3.22** -0.050 -1.16   
External pressure      
# Village sharing pasture  -0.010 0.35  -0.044 -0.52  
Transhumants using pasture  0.008 0.17  0.200 2.64 ** 
Coefficient of Variation, Rainfall  .653 3.35**  -.783 -2.52 ** 
Constant 1.457 4.56**    -.620 -1.22   
Number of observations  48   48  



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3--Income by source, food buyer households - partial results 
    
  (endogenous variables: income by source)        
            
    Marginal effect on income (1000 CFAF) 
      Total  Crop  Livestock   Non-ag.
1 Migration
1 
            
Shifters in crop production           
  Potential Yield (10 kg/ha) - instrumented  8.0*  1.8**  -1.9*  -0.2  8.5* 
  Agriculturalist ethnic group +  -9.9  24.1**  -49.2**  -6.7  118.5** 
            
Shifters in livestock production           
  Land availability  (10 ha per household)  5.0  -1.0  10.9**  -16.2**  2.3 
  Network Capacity   19.7  66.9*  -9.1  77.2  -38.3 
 Implementation  Capacity  169.0**  23.7  123.8**  -22.4  10.8 
            
Education          
  Public education +  112.6**  58.1**  -14.4  84.1**  26.5 
 Adult  Literacy  +  24.0  ￿  ￿  ￿  -68.7 
                    
          
Average value of income (1000 CFAF)  459.6  156.3  184.2  43.2  75.8 
Estimation with robust IV for total, crop, and livestock income, and with IV Tobit for off-farm and migration income.  In 
addition to the reported variables, explanatory variables include distance to market, age of household head, number of men 
and women 16-60 years old, and an Oudalan dummy.  Number of observations: 325 buyers of food. 
* (**) indicates coefficient significant at more than 90% (95%).       
￿ indicates that public education stands for "public education or literacy"     
1 Marginal effect among participants to the activity         







Table A4--Income by source, food self-sufficient households - partial results 
   
  (endogenous variables: income by source)         
            
    Marginal effect on income (1000 CFAF) 
      Total  Crop  Livestock  Non-ag.
1 Migration
1 
            
Shifters in crop production           
  Potential Yield (10 kg/ha) - instrumented  11.4* 0.6  3.3*  3.6  -21.5** 
  Agriculturalist ethnic group +  -48.8  11.2  -44.6  -118.5  -21.7 
            
Shifters in livestock production           
  Land availability  (10 ha per household)  2.0  1.0  5.4  -18.4  -42* 
  Network Capacity   -511.6 59.1  -369**  1193*  1812* 
 Implementation  Capacity  338.3 -123.1 523**  -963**  -410.5 
            
Education          
  Public education +  128.7 -0.1  -54.2  315**  405** 
 Adult  Literacy  +  -48.8  ￿  ￿  -161.6  -946** 
                    
          
Average value of income (1000 CFAF)  497.4 254.3 151.0  61.9  30.2 
Estimation  with robust IV for total, crop, and livestock income, and with IV Tobit for off-farm and migration 
income.  In addition to the reported variables, explanatory variables include number of dependents, transfer 
dummy, age of household head, and number of men and women 16-60 years old.  Number of observations: 48 
self-sufficent households in food. 
* (**) indicates coefficient significative at more than 90% (95%).       
￿ indicates that public education stands for "public education or literacy"     
1 Marginal effect among participants to the activity     
+ :  Dummy variables






Table A5--Determinants of household participation (Probit) 
 
 
  All activity   
Water 
maintenance    Deforestation   
Erosion 
control   
  Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z    Coef. z 
                     
INC -0.1152  -0.15  -0.5211 -0.59  3.0364 1.84 *  2.3746 2.28** 
IIC 1.0194  1.28  0.6492 0.75  0.6075 0.61   0.491 0.64 
Size household (AE)  0.0138  0.53  0.0248 1.00  0.0085 0.42   -0.0085 -0.31 
Age head household  -0.1192  -0.47  -0.4549 -1.87* -0.1925 -0.64    0.2737 0.80 
No off-farm income  -0.2491  -1.27  -0.2367 -1.37  -0.9366 -2.52 **  -0.5761 -2.55** 
No education  -0.015  -0.11  0.1442 0.96  -0.1584 -0.81   -0.1581 -0.81 
Ethnicity of household head  0.1296  0.61  -0.2221 -0.91  0.1672 0.48   0.5007 2.07** 
Size of cropland holdings  0.2609  1.83*  0.2459 1.58  0.5118 2.42 **  0.3453 2.00** 
Proportion of income 
from off-farm work  -0.1152 -0.26  0.2174 0.43  -1.0013 -1.49   -1.3368 -2.34** 
One water organization           0.3213 1.05                   
Nb obs.    358   301   224    266 
Prob>Chi2    0.009   0.025   0.000    0.000 
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